Journal of Conflict and Security Law Advance Access originally published online on September 17, 2008
Journal of Conflict and Security Law 2008 13(2):273-287; doi:10.1093/jcsl/krn019
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Reflections on the USA–India Atomic Energy Cooperation
* Department of Public Law, European Law and International Law, Justus-Liebig-University of Giessen, 35394 Giessen, Germany. E-mail: Zacharie.F.Ntoubandi{at}recht.uni-giessen.de
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Abstract |
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On 2 March 2006, the USA sealed a civilian nuclear cooperation deal with India, which ended more than three decades of US sanction against India. On 9 July 2008, India took a decisive step towards implementing the deal by submitting to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)'s Board of Governors for approval a draft safeguards plan aiming at applying the IAEA safeguards to its civilian nuclear programme. The proposed deal raises two issues of utmost importance that may become fundamental in shaping the future of the international effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Firstly, it impacts on the existing nuclear non-proliferation legal regime, and may have consequences on the behaviour of other actors in the field of non-proliferation. In this sense, the proposed deal appears to be in contradiction with the basic rationale of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that requires a non-nuclear-weapon state to receive civilian nuclear assistance only after it has foregone nuclear weapons. In addition, the deal may have opened up a Pandora's Box for claims based on the safety exception contained in the NSG Guidelines, which would allow members of the NSG to proliferate at will. Secondly, the controversial deal may achieve the very objectives of non-proliferation during its implementation phase, providing that as a result of it, India adheres to the NPT, becomes a full member of the NSG and accepts IAEA's safeguards and NSG Guidelines on export and control. The future of the military component of India's nuclear programme will then depend on the general attitude adopted by all nuclear weapon states towards implementing fully their other basic obligations under the NPT.